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We present evidence from a natural field experiment involving nearly 100,000 individuals on the effects
of offering economic incentives for blood donations. Subjects who were offered economic rewards
to donate blood were more likely to donate, and more so the higher the value of the rewards. They
were also more likely to attract others to donate, spatially alter the location of their donations towards
the drives offering rewards, and modify their temporal donation schedule leading to a short-term reduction
in donations immediately after the reward offer was removed. Although offering economic incentives,
combining all of these effects, positively and significantly increased donations, ignoring individuals
who took additional actions beyond donating to get others to donate would have led to an under-estimate
of the total effect, whereas ignoring the spatial effect would have led to an over-estimate of the total
effect. We also find that individuals who received a reward by surprise were less likely to donate after
the intervention than subjects who received no reward, suggesting that for some individuals a surprise
reward adversely affected their intrinsic motivations. We discuss the implications of these findings
for understanding pro-social behavior.
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A vast debate exists as to whether offering economic incentives increases motivation for individuals to 
provide public goods and perform pro-social activities, or instead inhibits them from performing such 
activities. Answering this question is important to understand how to foster contributions to public goods that 
involve a large part of social life but for which supply often falls below societal needs.
1 Standard economic 
theory predicts that the addition of an economic incentive will add to any intrinsic utility individuals receive 
to perform pro-social activities. However, research in psychology and behavioral economics suggest that 
offering economic incentives can backfire by crowding out the intrinsic motives involved in performing pro-
social activities or by negatively affecting an individual’s social or self-image (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 
Deci, 1975). The available evidence offers mixed results; some studies find that incentives enhance pro-
social activities while others document negative responses.
2 
This paper presents a comprehensive study on the impact of offering economic incentives on a pro-social 
activity that has high social relevance, no substitutes and experiences frequent shortages: donating blood.
3 
We find that individuals who were offered economic rewards to donate blood were not only more likely to 
donate, and more so the higher the value of the rewards, but were also more likely to attract others to donate, 
spatially alter the location of their donations towards the intervention drives offering rewards, and modify 
their temporal donation schedule leading to a short-term reduction in donations immediately after the reward 
offer was removed. Although the total effect of offering economic incentives, combining all of these effects, 
positively and significantly increased donations, ignoring individuals who took additional actions beyond 
donating to get others to donate would have led to an under-estimate of the total effect, whereas ignoring the 
spatial effect would have led to an over-estimate of the total effect. We also find that individuals who 
received a reward by surprise were less likely to donate after the intervention than subjects who received no 
reward, suggesting that for some individuals a surprise reward adversely affected their intrinsic motivations. 
Our evidence comes from a natural field experiment involving 98,278 individuals and 72 blood drives 
conducted with the American Red Cross Blood Service in Northern Ohio (ARC) from September 2009 to 
August 2010. Among over 7,000 annual ARC blood drives, we randomly selected 72 drives to study which 
had similar and typical characteristics, such as their historical average turnout. We then randomly selected 36 
of the 72 drives to provide rewards of $5, $10 or $15 in the form of gift cards from various stores. While all 
                                                            
1 In the US, for example, charitable giving totals more than  $260 billion, or around 1.9% of personal income (Andreoni, 
2007), and the estimated value of volunteer time is over $240 billion (Independent Sector, 2006). The number of non-
profit organizations registered with the IRS grew by about 60% from 1995 to 2005 (List, 2011). 
2 Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (forthcoming), Kamenica (2011), and Meier (2007) offer reviews of this literature. 
3 Blood transfusions are required in case of trauma, surgeries, the treatment of premature babies, and several types of 
cancer and blood-related diseases. Population ageing and new surgical procedures such as organ transplantations are 
substantially increasing the demand for blood. However, only about 5% of eligible individuals donate blood in 
developed countries, and even fewer do so in developing countries. The availability of blood at any given time is often 
below the target of three days of demand at each location and for each blood type. It is also estimated that, worldwide, 
there is a shortage of about 22 million units of blood per year (DiRado, 2004; Hemobiotech, 2008; Oakley, 1996). 3 
 
potential donors included in the ARC’s contact lists were informed about the drives using standard ARC 
procedures, in 27 of 36 reward drives (called “Advertised reward” drives) we informed 50% of the subjects 
of the presence and dollar amount of the gift cards. The remaining 50% of the subjects at the Advertised 
reward drives were not informed of the gift card offer and represent an almost ideal control for the informed 
individuals because they would have the same demographics and blood drive conditions (e.g., location and 
hours of operation). However, the informed subjects at the Advertised reward drives might be motivated to 
do more than donate and may attract others to donate – a form of pro-social behavior itself. To assess the 
presence of this indirect effect, in the remaining 9 reward drives (called “Surprise reward” drives) no subject 
was informed of the rewards; thus any difference in behavior of the uninformed individuals at the Advertised 
and Surprise reward drives will be an indicator of these indirect efforts. Finally, no rewards were offered in 
the remaining 36 drives (called “No reward” drives). Donations at No reward drives provide a comparison to 
those at the Surprise reward drives to validate our identifying assumption that subjects at the Surprise reward 
drives were in fact unaware of the rewards. Moreover, the post-intervention behavior of donors at the No 
reward drives (who were neither aware of nor received a reward) is used as control for comparison with the 
behavior of the individuals who donated at an Advertised reward drive and were informed of the reward, and 
with those who donated at a Surprise reward drive and hence were not informed of the reward.  
In addition, the ARC provided us with information on the subjects’ demographics (gender, age, blood 
type), and previous donation experience (if any), which allowed us to test for heterogeneous treatment 
effects. Moreover, we observed the donation behavior of the subjects not only at the intervention locations, 
but also at any other ARC drive to assess whether the observed effects at the intervention locations were 
genuine or instead represented spatial substitution. 
We also followed the donation behavior of the subjects for nine months after the intervention period to 
gauge the overall impact of the rewards. The presence of an incentive, while possibly increasing the 
propensity to donate at a given time, might reduce donations in the future because of inter-temporal 
substitution or decreased intrinsic motivation (Deci and Flaste, 1996). By following subjects for nine months 
after the intervention, we can separate inter-temporal substitution (a shift in the timing of a single donation) 
from changes in motivation or over-justification that would result in a more permanent long-term reduction 
in donations. Alternatively, rewards might elicit reciprocity in the form of more donations in the future (Falk, 
2007), especially if the gift was unexpected. In addition, if a temporary reward offer encourages subjects to 
make a donation, the donation experience provides subjects with an opportunity to update their beliefs on the 
costs and benefits of this activity (e.g. physiological or time involved), especially for new and infrequent 
donors. The provision of incentives at a given time might also not carry any consequences for future 
donations. 
We find that the likelihood of donating at Advertised reward drives for those informed of the incentives 
was 1.02%, versus 0.65% for those uninformed of the rewards at the same drives, and 0.53% of those 4 
 
contacted for Surprise reward drives. The positive effect increased in the dollar amount of the rewards. In 
absolute terms, most of the increase in donations was among subjects with a prior donation history at the 
intervention sites, with the average percentage donating in this group increasing from 15% when uninformed 
to 20% when informed. However, in relative terms the response was stronger for those who had never 
donated at an intervention site in the past, especially for the $15 reward. Although the response to incentives 
did not vary by gender or blood type, incentives had a stronger effect on subjects who were older, had longer 
donation history, and had donated in the recent past. 
We also find that a higher percentage of subjects who had not been informed of the presence of a reward 
at Advertised reward drives donated than the subjects informed about a Surprise reward drive, and this gap 
widened with higher values of the reward. We interpret this as evidence of an additional, indirect effect of 
incentives, whereby those informed of the rewards through official ARC channels motivate others to donate. 
A survey conducted at a subsample of treatment drives, as well as the analysis of the subset of individuals 
who donated at the intervention drives but were not contacted by the ARC (including first-time donors), offer 
findings consistent with this interpretation. These additional indirect effects suggest that our analysis 
showing higher donations among the informed than uninformed donors at the Advertised reward drives may 
underestimate the direct effect on those informed of incentives on their donations. We thus determine the 
direct effect of the incentives at the intervention drives by comparing the donations of individuals contacted 
for Surprise reward drives, where no donor-to-donor communication could occur, with those contacted for 
Advertised reward drives. On average, the likelihood of donating blood was 6.7 percentage points higher in 
the case of individuals with past history (19.9% among those informed compared to 13.2% of those 
uninformed at the Surprise drives), and 0.17 percentage points higher for those without past history (0.25% 
among informed subjects and 0.08% among the uninformed). The effects were increasing with the dollar 
amount of the reward, with the $5 dollar rewards increasing the number of donations by 3.5 percentage 
points, the $10 rewards increasing donations by 6.9 percentage points, and the $15 reward increasing 
donations by 9.5 percentage points, respectively, for the individuals with past history at the sites, and by 
0.06, 0.14 and 0.37 percentage points, respectively, for those with no previous history at the sites. 
We further examine whether the increase in donations at the intervention sites was a genuine increase in 
donations or the result of spatial or inter-temporal displacement. Spatial displacement indeed occurred for 
donors with a prior donation history at the intervention sites, especially in response to the highest dollar 
value reward; on average, 26% of the increase in donations was due to a decline in donations during the 
intervention time at sites other than the intervention locations, and 40% when $15 rewards were offered.  
We also find that inter-temporal substitution occurred; difference-in-difference individual fixed-effect 
regressions show that among subjects who donated during the intervention, those informed of the rewards 
were on average 12% less likely to donate three months after than before the intervention than those 
contacted for the No reward drives. Like the spatial displacement, the inter-temporal displacement was 5 
 
largest among subjects informed of the $15, reaching 20% fewer subjects who donated three month after than 
before the intervention. However, the inter-temporal decline was limited to the three months following the 
intervention, indicating that donors adjusted their donation schedule (i.e., substituted inter-temporally) rather 
than experienced any long-term loss in motivation to donate blood. Unexpectedly given the extensive support 
for reciprocal preferences in lab experiments, we find that subjects who received a reward at a Surprise drive 
were less likely to donate after the intervention for the full nine months we followed subjects after the 
intervention. This long-term reduction in donations is consistent with the surprise gift undermining intrinsic 
motivation to donate blood. We explore several explanations for this behavior. 
To our knowledge, this is the largest and most comprehensive experiment on the impact of extrinsic 
incentives for blood donations, and among the largest on the impact of material rewards on pro-social 
behavior in general. Goette and Stutzer’s (2008) natural field experiment in Switzerland with over 10,000 
previous blood donors found that offering lottery tickets increased blood donations, whereas a free 
cholesterol test had no effect. Mellstrom and Johannesson’s (2008) experiment in Sweden with 262 college 
students who had never donated blood found that offering cash rewards to take a health test to determine 
their eligibility to donate blood had no effect on male subjects and a negative effect on females’ propensity to 
take the test. Our previous study (Lacetera, Macis and Slonim, forthcoming) using observational and 
experimental data at the drive level found that material rewards had a positive effect on turnout and units 
collected at blood drives offering rewards, no effect on the share of donors eligible to donate, and a reduction 
in donations at neighboring drives not offering rewards. All of these studies considered only the short-term 
(one-shot) impact of incentives and did not look at alternative actions that individuals might take beyond 
donating blood themselves.
4  
This study is the first to provide a comprehensive view of the short and long-term effects of economic 
incentives on blood donations using individual-level data. More specifically, this is the first study to assess, 
in one setting, how the size of the incentives affects donations, whether any observed changes in donations 
are genuine or displace donations elsewhere, whether any observed change in donations is genuine or the 
result of inter-temporal substitution, whether there are any other long-term effects (e.g., inter-temporal 
crowding, reciprocity), whether incentives cause any actions beyond donating (e.g. getting others to donate), 
and whether incentive effects are homogeneous or heterogeneous in the population. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ARC’s operations and gives details on the 
Northern Ohio Unit where the experiment was run. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the data. 
Section 4 presents the findings and Section 5 concludes. 
                                                            
4 A literature has developed also on the provision of incentives for organ donation. See for example Becker and Elias 
(2007), Kessler and Roth (forthcoming), and Roth (2007). Some papers have considered the impact of different 
incentives systems on activities that, while remunerated financially, are also thought to include intrinsic utility (e.g., 
Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack, 2011; Hall, Propper and Van Reenen, 2008; Miller et al., 2011). 6 
 
2. Institutional Background: The American Red Cross in Northern Ohio  
The Northern Ohio Blood Service Unit of the American Red Cross (ARC) runs over 7,000 blood drives per 
year.
5 Blood drives are run in partnership with a “host” organization that works with an ARC representative 
to collect blood. The host organizations (e.g., schools, churches, community centres, private firms and 
hospitals) provide space at a specific location and date, and the ARC provides the administrative and 
collection staff and physical equipment for the blood collection. 
Several thousand individuals are typically informed about each blood drive. In most counties in Northern 
Ohio the ARC sends out a flyer on the 23
rd or 24
th of a month indicating all the drives that will occur in the 
county in the following month.
6 Figure 1 provides an example of a flyer (identifying information has been 
blacked out for privacy considerations). The flyers include information on each drive’s location and hours of 
operation, whether an incentive is offered and, if an incentive is offered, the specific type of incentive. About 
40% of the blood drives offer a promotion item – provided by either the ARC or the drive’s host – and there 
is essentially never more than one item at a drive. Common items include T-shirts, coupons, jackets, coolers, 
blankets and gift cards from various merchants. The ARC mails each county flyer to everyone who has 
previously donated in that county who is “active” and “eligible.” An active donor is someone who has 
donated at least once over the past two years and an eligible donor is someone who the ARC knows is not 
currently disqualified. Donors can be disqualified either because the donation may endanger the donor or 
because the donation would be unusable; examples include individuals with anaemia, low blood pressure or 
low iron, and recent behavior that increases the risk of potential blood problems that tests cannot detect. 
Donors are also not permitted to donate for 56 days after making a whole blood donation. 
 
3. Experimental design and data 
3.1 Design 
We ran our experiment over four periods: September 2009, December 2009, March 2010, and July-August 
2010. The four periods gave us the opportunity to collect more independent observations and control for 
possible seasonal effects. We established a set of six criteria that all potential drives would have to meet to be 
in our study, such that the drives would be similar to each other, avoid atypical drive characteristics, and 
avoid potentially confounding concerns for our analyses. Once we established a set of potential drives to 
include, we randomized among them which ones to include, then randomized among the selected drives 
which ones would be in each condition.  
                                                            
5 The ARC operates 36 regional blood centers within the US and Puerto Rico. Northern Ohio covers 10,206 square 
miles and includes major cities such as Cleveland and Akron. In 2010, about 4.1 million people lived in Northern Ohio, 
median income was about $47,000 (overall US: $50,221); the unemployment rate was 9.9% (US: 9.6%); and there were 
83% Caucasian and 11.4% African Americans (US: 72.4% and 12.6%). 
6 Monthly flyers are sent in 17 of the 21 counties where the ARC-Northern Ohio operates. People in the remaining 4 
counties are sent postcards about specific drives. We only considered counties where information is through flyers. 7 
 
The six criteria a drive had to meet for inclusion are as follows. First, we excluded “closed” drives (i.e., 
drives restricted to a narrow set of donors such as high school students) because they limit who can donate 
and thus limit broader potential effects of an incentive offer. Closed drives represent about 20% of all drives. 
Second, we required host locations to have run at least three drives in the year prior to the first intervention 
period (henceforth, the reference year) so that we would have substantial data on behavior prior to our 
intervention for better control measures.
7 Less than 22% of host locations had two or fewer drives in the 
reference year. Third, we restricted the host location’s average turnout during the reference year to be within 
one standard deviation of the overall mean turnout in Northern Ohio drives (11.9 to 57.5 donors) to avoid 
unusually large or small drives that could be sensitive to idiosyncratic issues (e.g., during holiday weekends). 
About 70% of all donations in the reference year were made at drives within one standard deviation of the 
mean. Fourth, we required that no more than 50% of the drives at the host location during the reference year 
offered an incentive. By removing these uncommon locations where incentives were the norm, we avoid 
situations in which our intervention control drive locations that offer no rewards could be unusual for not 
offering incentives at a location that historically offered them. Fifth, we ensured that the ARC did not 
introduce any additional incentives at our intervention drives because we did not want any other incentive 
offer in addition to ours since it was rare for the ARC to offer more than one reward at a drive. We also only 
used drives in which no incentive was offered at the same location in the drive immediately prior to the 
intervention drive so that the sequence of rewards between treatment and control drives would hold constant 
the preceding drive at the level of no rewards. Last, all drive locations in the experiment had to be at least 
five miles apart from each other to avoid possible contaminations across the experimental drives. 
Among all drives meeting the above criteria, we randomly chose 18 per period in 9 pairs such that the 
drives within a pair were held in the same county while each pair was in a different county. Within each pair 
we randomly assigned one drive to have a reward (henceforth, Reward drives) and the other to have no 
reward (henceforth, No reward drives); this resulted in a total of 36 Reward and 36 No reward drives. The 
Reward and No reward drives were not only similar in meeting the above criteria, but also had the identical 
population of potential donors who were contacted since the drives in a pair were advertised on the same 
county flyer.
8 Since no incentive was offered at the No reward drives, from the potential donor’s perspective 
these drives are identical to any other ARC drive that did not offer a reward.  
At the Reward drives, donors could choose either one, two or three $5 gift cards for our $5, $10 and $15 
treatments, respectively. Anyone presenting to donate would receive the gift cards regardless of whether they 
donated. Having three dollar values lets us estimate the shape of the supply curve whereas offering only one 
value might not reflect how other values would affect performance; Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that 
                                                            
7 The reference year is from 5/18/2008 through 5/18/2009. Because the ARC allocates incentives to drives months in 
advance, it was important that we pre-selected our intervention drives as much in advance as possible to ensure that no 
incentives would be allocated at those sites in the drives immediately prior to our intervention drives. 
8 In a few cases, the No reward and Reward drives, while being in the same county, were advertised on separate flyers. 8 
 
the value of the reward offered to lab subjects for performance on an IQ test had a non-monotonic effect on 
performance with a small reward resulting in a negative effect and a large reward resulting in a positive 
effect. We randomly allocated the dollar value treatments equally across the 36 Reward drives so that there 
were 12 Reward drives per dollar value, and an equal balance of dollar values across the four time periods. 
The gift card selection included merchants that sell food, gasoline and general merchandise (e.g., Wal-Mart, 
Target, BP, Buehler’s, and Giant Eagle). 
We chose to offer gifts cards as rewards for several reasons. First, unlike offering a specific item (e.g., T-
shirts), the broad range of items the gift cards let donors purchase gives us confidence that the monetary 
value to the donors will be the same; we can also assume that rewards of differing amounts, if offered in the 
form of gift cards, will be ranked in the same way ($15>$10>$5) by all subjects, whereas offering specific 
items could introduce heterogeneity.
 Second, we let donors choose gift cards from multiple merchants to 
increase the “liquidity” of the reward. Third, the cards excluded any reference to the ARC or blood donations 
to minimize any symbolic or signaling value. Fourth, gift cards are common promotion items offered by the 
ARC and the three dollar values we offered are within the normal range of perceived values of the items that 
the ARC offers, therefore the gift cards should not be perceived as “unusual”. An unusual gift item may 
signal, for instance, that there is a greater need for blood or that the ARC might be running an experiment, 
thus potentially compromising the validity of the study.
9 Finally, offering gift cards lets us track usage; if the 
cards were not used, then that would suggest that their dollar values are not a good proxy for the value of the 
gift to the donor.
10 
All active and eligible donors included in the ARC’s contact lists were informed about the blood drives 
through the ARC’s normal communication channels. We randomized the 36 Reward drives into two 
conditions: 27 “Advertised reward” drives and nine “Surprise reward” drives. Seven of the 27 Advertised 
reward drives occurred in each of the first three periods and the other six occurred in the last period. In the 
Advertised reward drives, a random sample of approximately half of the subjects in each drive was informed 
that a reward would be given, the types of gift cards offered, and the total dollar amount of the reward.
11 
                                                            
9 More generally, it may be argued that the presence of rewards is perceived as a signal of scarcity of blood. Thus the 
reaction would be to the information about scarcity, rather than to the rewards per se. Note however that the subjects 
received information about a whole set of drives in the monthly fliers (see Figure 1), with some offering and some not 
offering rewards. Therefore it is unlikely that they derive any specific information on scarcity from a single drive on the 
flier.  
10 Offering cash may have further guaranteed the same monetary value to the donors; however the FDA prohibits that 
blood collected from donors paid in cash be labeled as blood coming from volunteer donors, therefore the policy of the 
ARC is to not offer cash. This might raise the question of whether gift cards may elicit a different response than cash. 
Some research has shown that small in-kind rewards might be more effective than direct cash because they are not 
interpreted as part of a market transaction. However, cash was found to be as strong a motivator (if not stronger) than 
in-kind gifts for non-negligible dollar values (Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Furthermore, in experiments where subjects 
are asked to choose among in-kind and cash prizes, most subjects choose cash even if they stated a preference for the in-
kind gift (Kube, Marechal and Puppe, forthcoming). 
11 While we do not know the full name of the contacted individuals, we have information on the unique ID number for 
each subject and to the first letter of their last names. Based on this letter, at the Advertised reward drives we randomly 9 
 
However, we could eventually use only 26 of the 27 Advertised treatment drives in the analysis because, at 
one drive, unforeseen contingencies did not allow the host to apply the experimental protocol. In the 
remaining nine Surprise reward drives (two in each of the first three periods, and three in the last period), no 
subject was informed of the presence of an incentive. Recall that all presenting donors at a Reward drive, 
regardless of their awareness of the reward, would be offered the reward. 
This design, shown in Table 1a, allows us to examine the direct effect on the change in the likelihood to 
donate for subjects informed of the reward offer, and indirect effects in which informed subjects may 
motivate uninformed individuals to donate. The uninformed-of-reward subjects at the Advertised reward 
drives provide a natural control group for the informed subjects (Row 1 vs. Row 2); the random assignment 
of subjects to be uniformed or informed ensures that the characteristics and donation opportunities (e.g., date, 
location, weather conditions and host personnel involved) of the two groups will be the same. However, we 
anticipated that (officially) uninformed of reward subjects could learn about the rewards from the informed 
subjects through word-of-mouth or other social networking activities. To address this possibility, we 
included the Surprise reward drives in the design so that we can quantify these indirect effects. Since no 
subject invited to a Surprise drive was informed of rewards, the donation behavior of this group provides a 
benchmark for the donations of the uninformed subjects at the Advertised drives; the difference in the 
likelihood to donate between these two groups gives us one measure of the possible informed subjects’ 
indirect efforts to motivate others (Row 2 vs. Row 3). We also designed the experiment to estimate any 
effects of incentives on uninformed subject’s behavior if drive hosts or ARC personnel communicated with 
subjects through informal channels about the rewards. Although we did not anticipate any informal 
communications since ARC personnel were requested to follow our protocols, the design let us test for any 
informal ARC or host communications by comparing donations at Surprise reward drives with donations at 
the No Reward drives (Rows 3 vs. Row 4 of Table 1a). 
In addition to examining the effects during the intervention, we designed the study to examine longer 
term effects in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of offering incentives. 
We accomplish this by comparing the difference in long term donation behavior between subjects who were 
informed of rewards at the Advertised reward drives and subjects at the No reward drives (Row 1 vs. Row 
4). Thus, we included the No reward drives to not only verify no informal activity by the ARC and hosts, but 
more importantly, their primary purpose will be as the control group in the analyses of long term effects. 
There are two potential reasons why future donations may be lower after than before a reward was 
offered. First, a donation during the intervention might replace a future donation. In this case, the immediate 
positive response to the incentive would be due to short-term inter-temporal substitution, and thus any 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
assigned either the subjects whose last name initial was between A-K, or those whose initial was L-Z, to receive a 
version of the flyer with information also on the presence of rewards. The “cutoff” was set between K and L because 
roughly half of last names in the US begin with a letter between A and K. 10 
 
positive short term effect would over-estimate the total effect. Second, Deci and Flaste (1996) argue that the 
presence of incentives could alter donors’ perception of their motivation for donating. In this case, a donor’s 
intrinsic motivation to donate will fall after receiving an incentive. This lower utility and related decline in 
donations, in contrast to inter-temporal substitution, would persist over a longer period of time, and would 
indicate that any positive short-term effects could substantially over-estimate the total effect. By observing 
subject’s donation behavior for nine months after the intervention, we can thus distinguish between a short-
term inter-temporal substitution effect and a longer-term reduction in utility to donate.  
The impact of rewards on future donations can also be positive. First, economic incentives may nudge 
subjects to develop a donation habit. Evidence consistent with incentives temporarily offered stimulating 
longer term habits has been found in the case of physical exercise (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Royer, Stehr 
and Sydnor, 2011). Meer (2010) and Rosen and Sims (2010) also show habit formation in charitable giving. 
Second, someone who donates when an incentive is offered will learn more about the donation experience, 
and potentially positively update their expectations about the time involved (e.g., the bleed time is usually 
under 10 minutes and the whole process is usually under one hour) and the lack of physical discomfort 
during and after the procedure (e.g., not as painful or tiring as expected). The Surprise drives also let us 
examine reciprocal preferences and potential sorting among donors who donated when they were and were 
not aware of the reward. For instance, Falk (2007) found that people are more likely to make a monetary 
donation when they receive an unexpected gift item. We also anticipated that subjects who donate when they 
know a reward has been offered (the informed-of-rewards subjects who donate at the Advertised drives) may 
have a different reaction to receiving rewards than subjects who were unaware (the subjects who donate at 
the Surprise drives). When uninformed of the rewards, some subjects may present to donate who would have 
avoided donating if they had known about the reward; providing rewards to these subjects thus might 
negatively affect their willingness to donate in the future. For instance, Lazear, Malmendier and Weber 
(forthcoming) found significant sorting among laboratory subjects to avoid making decisions in games that 
elicit social preferences. 
A few other features of the design are worth mentioning. First, the ARC guaranteed that identical, 
standard procedures were used for all 71 drives in the experiment. Second, subjects were never informed that 
a study was being conducted and since gift cards and other items of similar value are often offered by the 
ARC, it is reasonable to assume that subjects were never aware they were participating in a study and, thus, 
being observed. Last, the random assignment of rewards to drives and who was informed about them were 
the only changes to the ARC’s operations; no other aspect (e.g. personnel, location, supplies, and 
communications) was changed. Our design is therefore a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). 
Design Checks. Before turning to the data and results, we make three points to verify the validity of the 
design. First, we conducted an anonymous survey at the Reward drives during the last two intervention 11 
 
periods (March and July-August 2010), to assess whether the information regarding the rewards was 
communicated as designed. The survey asked presenting donors whether they knew about the presence of 
gift cards before coming to the blood drive, and if so, how they knew about them. The survey response rate 
was 94% and we collected 640 surveys. Among those who were sent fliers with the rewards information, 
52% indicated knowing about them, and primarily through the fliers.
12 In contrast, only 4% (6/159) of the 
respondents at the Surprise reward drives indicated knowing about the rewards. This stark contrast confirms 
that the official communication of rewards to inform subjects was effective, and the lack of awareness of 
subjects at the Surprise drives is consistent with our understanding that ARC representatives and drive hosts 
would not informally communicate with anyone about the rewards. Among the respondents who were on the 
uninformed-of-reward list at the Advertised reward drives, 17% indicated knowing about the rewards, and a 
large share of these reported that they knew through family and friends. 
Second, to further investigate whether the same standard recruitment procedures were used for the drives 
with and without rewards, we compared donations at No reward drives (where no incentives were present, 
and so incentives could not have motivated any informal actions by ARC representatives or drive hosts) with 
donations at Surprise reward drives where ARC representatives were aware of the incentives, but no subjects 
were formally informed of them. We could not detect any differences in donations at the Surprise and No 
reward drives (see Table A1 in the Appendix), further validating this aspect of our experimental design. 
Third, we examined whether gift cards were actually taken and used; if donors either refused to accept 
the cards or did not use them, then we would have lost some control by offering an item that the subjects did 
not value. However, we found, perhaps even a little surprising, that 98% of the cards offered were taken and 
more than 90% of the sum of all the cards’ value was spent within the first four weeks after being given out. 
Thus, we are confident that the subjects perceived the rewards as providing economic value. 
 
3.2 Data 
The ARC provided us with drive-level and individual-level data. The drive-level data includes the number of 
presenting donors, units of blood collected, and number of deferred donors at all our intervention drives for 
the year prior to, during, and at least nine months after the intervention. The individual-level data includes 
information on everyone contacted during the intervention (i.e., the subjects) plus anyone who donated at an 
intervention drive but had not been contacted, which includes new and lapsed donors (i.e., eligible but 
inactive). The individual data includes the total number of past donations, donation history (date and 
location) for the four years prior to our first intervention until nine months after our final intervention, and 
                                                            
12 There could be many reasons that only 52% of informed respondents indicated knew about the rewards. For instance, 
they may have forgotten or not wanted to admit that they knew about them. Alternatively, some donors may not have 
noticed the reward offer, and this possibility suggests that our results may under-estimate the effect of incentives to the 
extent that the subjects intended to be informed of the rewards, ceteris paribus, were in fact not all informed. 12 
 
demographics including gender, age and blood type. The individual donation information includes only 
successful donations since regulations prevent the ARC from disclosing information when a deferral occurs. 
Although deferral information would have been interesting to examine, the drive-level experimental data 
here and our past work (Lacetera et al., forthcoming) using historical drive-level data indicate that incentive 
offers did not affect deferrals, thus individual-level deferral information may not have been especially 
informative. To protect subject’s privacy the individual data we received were de-identified. 
The individual-level donation data allow us to distinguish between subjects who have and have not 
donated in the past at an intervention site. This heterogeneity is important because individuals who have 
previously donated at a drive are more likely to live closer to its location, know how to get to it and be 
familiar with the ARC staff and drive hosts. Therefore, we anticipated that subjects will be more likely to 
donate at an intervention site, ceteris paribus, if they had previously donated at that drive. This was indeed 
the case; subjects with previous history at a site are over one hundred times more likely to donate at the site 
than subjects who had never donated at the site. To control for this base rate heterogeneity, we generally 
present analyses for these two types of subjects separately which crucially helps us identify and quantify the 
effects of incentives with dramatically greater precision. The individual-level characteristics in the data also 
let us examine whether the potential effects of rewards were heterogeneous along a number of dimensions 
including gender, age, blood type, and the number and frequency of past donations. 
Table 1b shows the number of individuals contacted for each condition. Overall, 98,278 unique subjects 
were contacted for at least one intervention drive. About 50% of these subjects were contacted in exactly one 
intervention period, about 30% were contacted in two periods and 20% were contacted in three or four 
periods. As a result, there were 176,327 individual-period observations of contacted subjects. Once we limit 
the sample to the individuals who were eligible to donate at the intervention drives,
 we are left with 79,680 
unique individuals and 128,690 individual-period observations. Table 2 shows statistics on the characteristics 
of the drives in the three experimental conditions (i.e., No reward, Advertised reward, Surprise reward) 
during the reference year prior to our intervention and at the intervention drives. Given the random 
assignment of drives, the characteristics across the three treatment conditions are statistically identical (we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of no differences in means using t-tests for any pair-wise comparisons). 
Table 3 describes the characteristics of the individuals contacted for each treatment: informed of the 
reward at Advertised reward drives, not informed at Advertised reward drives, and invited to Surprise reward 
drives). Across the three conditions, subjects were observationally nearly identical overall (Columns 1-3), 
conditional on having previously donated at the intervention site (Columns 4-6) and on never having donated 
at the intervention site (Columns 7-9). Identifying subjects based on whether they have or have not donated 
at a specific location naturally led to substantial heterogeneity since individuals who donate at more locations 13 
 
will be more likely to have donated at a given location,
13 and the subject characteristics reflect this 
heterogeneity; subjects with a past history (Columns 4-6) on average had donated at approximately 3.0 
different locations whereas subjects without a past donation history at the sites (Columns 7-9) had donated 
on average at about 1.9 different locations. Consistent with identifying subjects who had donated at more 
locations, those with past history at an intervention site also had made more total donations, donated more 
recently and were older than those who had not donated at the intervention sites. This heterogeneity further 
stresses the importance to perform our analyses separately for subjects with and without past donation 
experience at the intervention sites. Our sample includes 4,745 and 123,945 individual-period observations 
with and without past donations at the intervention sites, respectively. 
 
4. Results 
We first report on the short-term impact of the rewards. We initially estimated the impact of offering rewards 
on donations at the intervention drives. We next analyzed how offering rewards affected donations at non-
intervention drives to measure any potential spatial substitution. We then compared the change in donation 
behavior of the subjects after versus before the intervention periods to assess the long-term effects of the 
rewards. We conclude this section with an attempt to quantify the overall monetary cost spent on the rewards 
for each additional unit of blood collected due to the reward offers, and to compare it to the benefits. 
 
4.1 Short-term responses 
4.1.1 The effect of the incentives at the Advertised reward drives 
Estimating direct effects: We first compare the donation behavior of subjects informed and uninformed of 
the rewards who were contacted for Advertised reward drives (henceforth “informed” and “uninformed” 
subjects). Uninformed subjects are a natural control group for the informed subjects not only because of the 
random assignment to be informed or uniformed, but also since they share the identical drive conditions.  
Figure 2 shows the impact of the reward offer on the subjects contacted for Advertised reward drives and 
separately for subjects with and without history at the sites for which they were contacted. Overall, 0.65% of 
uninformed subjects donated while 1.02% of informed subjects donated. Donations increased with the value 
of the reward and were especially large for the $15 drives where the percent of subjects who donated was 
                                                            
13 To better understand this point, consider a simple example of a county with two intervention drive locations, X and Y, 
and two types of people, A and B, that each make up half of the population. Suppose type A people have donated at 
both locations and half of type B people have only donated at X and the other half have only donated at Y. In this case, 
although there would be an equal number of type A and B overall (Columns 1-3), all type As and half of the type Bs 
have past history at an intervention drive (Columns 4-6) whereas no type As and half of type Bs have never donated at 
an intervention drive (Columns 7-9). Thus, the subjects who have donated at more locations (type As) will make up 
more of the population among those who have past history (they will make up 2/3 of this population) than among those 
who have never donated at an intervention site (they will make up 0 percent of this population). 14 
 
nearly twice as large among the informed (1.63%) than uninformed (0.90%) subjects. Figures 2B and 2C 
highlight the degree of heterogeneity between individuals with and without past history, respectively. 
Subjects who had donated previously at a site were dramatically more likely to donate; 15% of uninformed 
subjects with a previous history donated whereas just 0.10% of uninformed subjects with no previous history 
donated. Further, the response to incentives was stronger in absolute terms for those with previous history 
(from 15% to 20%) than without history (from 0.10% to 0.25%), but the response was much stronger in 
relative terms for those without previous history (150%) than with previous history (33%). To test for 
significance, we estimate versions of the following regression model: 
 
Prob(DONATEDijt =1) = f(INFO_REWARD, Xijt , j ,jt).      (1) 
 
The outcome variable DONATEDijt is a dummy for whether a subject i donated at intervention drive j on date 
t (during one of the intervention periods). The term j represents drive-level fixed effects, and Xijr represents 
individual-level controls. In the models we estimate, the coefficient on the dummy variable INFO_REWARD 
(equal to 1 if subject i was informed of a reward, and 0 otherwise) represents the difference in the probability 
of donating for subjects who were informed of an incentive relative to those who were not informed of the 
incentive at the same drive, ceteris paribus. We also use this model to estimate the effect of the three dollar 
values by replacing INFO_REWARD with $5–INFO_REWARD,  $10-INFO_REWARD, and $15-
INFO_REWARD. We include controls for gender (dummy for female), age (dummies for 25-49 and 50+), O-
Neg blood type, total donations to date (dummies for 2-9 and 10+) and most recent donation (within the last 
6 months or in the last 6 to 12 months). Throughout the paper, we present estimates from linear probability 
models because they allow us to conveniently include drive-level fixed effects; the estimates (and standard 
errors) shown in the tables have been multiplied by 100 to reflect the percentage change.
14 
Table 4 presents the results.
15 Column 1 shows that, overall, informed-of-reward subjects were 0.33 
percentage points more likely to donate than the uninformed subjects, an increase of just over 50%. Columns 
2 and 3 show that the likelihood to donate increased with the dollar value of the reward. Individuals with past 
history at the Advertised reward drives were about 170 times more likely to donate at these drives than 
subjects with no past history at these drives. Given this dramatic heterogeneity, we henceforth present 
estimates separately for subjects with and without previous donation history at the drives. 
Column 4 shows that offering rewards increased the donations by 4.5 percentage points for informed 
subjects who donated in the past at the Advertised reward sites (baseline 15.3%), with stronger effects for 
higher dollar values. Column 5, without controls for drive fixed effects, shows that a $5, $10, and $15 reward 
                                                            
14 The Appendix reports results from Logit estimates of our main models (Table A2). These estimates are very similar 
to the linear probability models.  
15 In addition to the effect of rewards, Table 4 shows that on average women were less likely to donate while the oldest 
subjects, subjects who had donated more than 10 times and subjects who had donated in the last six months were more 
likely to donate at the intervention drives. We discuss whether the incentive offer had any heterogeneous effects below. 15 
 
offer increased the donations by 1.3, 4.9 and 7.3 percentage points, respectively, compared to donations by 
the uninformed subjects across all Advertised reward drives, representing an 8%, 32% and 47% increase 
compared to the baseline of all uninformed subjects. The p-values for the significance of the increased 
donations with the higher dollar values are shown at the bottom of the tables;
16 the $10 and $15 reward offers 
attracted significantly more informed subjects to donate than the $5 offer. Column 6 includes drive-level 
fixed effects so that the subjects informed of an $X reward are now compared to the subjects at the same 
drive (X = 5, 10 and 15). Adding drive fixed effects allows us to control for idiosyncratic differences 
between the drives such as location and hours of operation. Including the drive fixed effects, the most notable 
difference is that we obtain much more similar estimates for the coefficients on three dollar amounts. This 
result does not necessarily imply that the direct effect of the reward offer on donations is the same regardless 
of the value of the reward; if information about the reward offer was conveyed from informed to uninformed 
subjects, and if this informal donor-to-donor communication was more prevalent for more valuable rewards, 
then uninformed subjects could also show a similar response to a reward offer as informed ones, which 
would compress the differences in the estimated likelihood of donating, and more so the higher the value of 
the reward. Figure 2b shows that indeed the uninformed subjects with a past history contacted for drives that 
offered higher rewards were more likely to donate (below we will explore donor-to-donor communications 
more formally). 
Columns 7-9 investigate the effects for subjects with no previous donation history at the advertised 
drives. The estimates show that while the absolute magnitude of the effects were smaller, they were 
statistically significant and large relative to the baseline donations of the uninformed subjects; being 
informed of a reward led to an average 0.16 percentage points increase on the likelihood to donate (Column 
7) compared to 0.09% for the uninformed subjects. Columns 8 and 9 further show that the effect was driven 
by the $10 and especially $15 reward offers. The response to the $15 reward offer was particularly large; it 
increased the likelihood to donate by 0.35 percentage points, almost 300% over the likelihood that the 
uninformed subjects donated. For subjects with no history, the $10 offer marginally significantly increased 
the likelihood to donate compared to the $5 offer and the $15 offer significantly increased the likelihood to 
donate compared to either the $5 or $10 offer. 
 
Estimating indirect effects: Figure 2b showed that donations across different reward values was increasing 
with the reward value among individuals who were uninformed of the rewards, which is consistent with these 
subjects learning about the reward offer from informed subjects. The survey evidence described in Section 3 
is also consistent with this potential donor-to-donor communication. The survey results indicate that 
significantly more donors at the Advertised reward drives who were not formally informed of the reward 
                                                            
16 We report one-tailed tests for the difference in the dollar reward amounts (e.g., $15 offer vs. $5 offer) since we 
assume any potential negative effects on motivation from being offered a reward are constant whereas the benefits are 
increasing as the reward value increases, consistent with Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) evidence. 16 
 
offer reported knowing about the reward (17%) than donors at the Surprise drive (4%) where no one was 
formally informed. Further, among the donors indicating they knew about the rewards, the uninformed 
donors at the Advertised drive were more likely to indicate learning about the reward offer from friends, 
family or co-workers (16.5%) than the informed donors (7.4%). This evidence suggests that offering rewards 
may have not only a direct effect of motivating individuals to donate, but also an indirect effect of motivating 
individuals to get others to donate.  
We formally test this indirect effect in two ways. First, we compare the behavior of the uninformed 
subjects at the Advertised drives (where half the subjects were informed) and at the Surprise drives (where 
no subject was informed). Any difference in donations may be attributed to (informed) donor-to-
(uninformed) donor communication since at both drives the ARC representatives and drive hosts were aware 
of the rewards, therefore only the presence of informed subjects systematically differs. Second, we compared 
the number of donations that occurred among individuals who were not contacted officially by the ARC for 
any drive at the Advertised reward drives (where half the donors were informed of the rewards) and at all 
other intervention drives (where no subjects were informed); if subjects informed of the reward were 
motivating others to donate, then other individuals beyond our subject population would learn about the 
rewards and thus result in higher donations at the Advertised than non advertised drives. 
Figures 3a and 3b and Table 5 present evidence on potential donor-to-donor communication by 
comparing the behavior of the uninformed-of-reward subjects contacted about Advertised reward drives with 
the behavior of those contacted for the Surprise reward drives. For subjects with past history at the drives, the 
percentage who donated was higher among those who were uninformed of rewards at Advertised than 
Surprise drives, and this difference increases with the dollar value of the reward. Further, the donations of the 
individuals contacted for Surprise reward drives did not vary with the dollar value of the reward, suggesting 
not only that the higher percentage of donations among the uninformed at the advertised drives was driven by 
informal communications, but also provides further corroboration of our experimental design in which ARC 
representatives and drive hosts did not informally communicate with anyone about the rewards. For those 
without a past history at the drives, the donations of the uninformed at Advertised reward sites and at 
Surprise reward sites were very similar to each other and essentially flat across the dollar values.  
In Table 5 we report estimates of versions of the following model to assess the magnitude and 
significance of potential donor-to-donor communications: 
 
Prob(DONATEDijt =1) = f(ADV_UNINFORMEDijk, Xijt , jt),    (2) 
 
where the dummy ADV_UNINFORMED equals 1 if a subject was contacted for an Advertised reward drive 
but was uninformed about the reward, and equals 0 if the subject was contacted for a Surprise reward drive. 
As before, we also estimate models where we create dummies for the different dollar levels of the rewards, 
and use linear probability models and the same basic specifications as for Equation (1). Drive-level fixed 17 
 
effects cannot be used here since all subjects at a drive were in the same treatment. Instead, period fixed 
effects are included in the regressions and we cluster the standard errors at the drive level.
17 
For subjects with prior history at the drive, those uninformed of the rewards at the Advertised reward 
drives were 2.4 percentage points more likely to donate than the subjects at the Surprise drives. This 
difference is driven in large part by the difference in donations at the $15 drives, although the estimate is 
only marginally statistically significant (p<.06).
18 This estimated 4.4 percentage point increase is similar in 
magnitude to the difference between the OLS and drive fixed effect estimates for the $15 reward in Table 4 
(7.3 - 4.7 in Columns 5 and 6). Therefore, it appears that informal donor-to-donor communications increases 
the likelihood that an officially uninformed subject will donate when individuals are informed of a $15 offer.  
For subjects with no past donations at the drives, no substantial effects are detected, which is consistent with 
the raw data shown in Figure 3b. 
Table 6 presents further evidence that informed individuals motivated others to donate. Here we examine 
the 328 individuals who donated at the intervention sites and who were not contacted through any formal 
ARC channel about the drives where they donated, not even about the presence of that drive. Among these 
individuals, 108 were first-time donors (i.e., there is no previous record of them donating anywhere). The 
remaining 220 donors had donated at some point in the past (henceforth “lapsed” donors). If there were no 
informal communications about the rewards, we would expect these individuals’ donations to be distributed 
across the drives proportionally to the number of intervention drives for each condition, thus 50.6% (36/71) 
at No reward drives, 36.7% (26/71) at Advertised reward drives, and 12.7% (9/71) at Surprise reward drives. 
However, Table 6 shows a “shift” in the actual distribution of these donors toward Advertised reward drives; 
46.3%, 43.5% and 47.7% of overall, first-time and lapsed donors donated at the Advertised drives relative to 
the 36.7% of all drives being Advertised, and the differences are statistically significant at the 1%, 7%and 
1% level, respectively (from binomial tests of proportions). We also find that the average number of not-
contacted donors per drive was higher at the Advertised reward drives (5.8) than the No reward and Surprise 
reward drives (3.9). Thus, almost 2 extra non-contacted individuals donated per Advertised reward drive 
when the ARC officially communicated the reward to only half the subjects. 
The total direct effect of incentives: To the extent that informal communication between subjects informed 
and uninformed of rewards motivated uninformed subjects to donate, the estimates in Table 4 understate the 
total direct effect of offering rewards. Thus we now compare the donations of subjects who were informed of 
rewards with those invited to the Surprise reward drives. We estimate versions of the following model: 
 
                                                            
17 The Tables report both robust standard errors (in parentheses) and drive-level clustered standard errors [in brackets].  
18 The estimate is significant at the 11.5% level if we consider a 2-tailed test, but is significant within the conventional 
10% level if we consider a one-tailed test. The one-tail test is appropriate here because we are testing the hypothesis of 
an additional positive effect with respect to a null of zero effect. 18 
 
Prob(DONATEDijt =1) = f(ADV_INFORMEDijk, Xijt , jt),    (3) 
 
which is identical to model (2) except that the sample here replaces the uninformed-of-reward subjects with 
those informed of the rewards (ADV_INFORMED=1), whereas subjects contacted for the Surprise reward 
drives remain the reference group (ADV_INFORMED=0).  
Table 7 presents the results. It shows that subjects with and without past donations at the intervention 
sites who were informed of the rewards were more likely to donate than those uninformed of the rewards. 
Across all three rewards values the likelihood to donate was 6.7 percentage points higher for subjects with 
past history (a relative increase of over 50% compared to a baseline of 13.2%), and 0.17 percentage points 
higher for those without past history (a relative increase of over 200% compared to a baseline of 0.08%). The 
effects were increasing in the dollar value of the reward; the $5, $10 and $15 rewards increased the 
probability of donating by 3.5, 6.9, and 9.5 percentage points, respectively, for subjects with a past history at 
the sites, and by 0.06 (marginally significant), 0.14 (marginally significant) and 0.37 percentage points for 
subjects with no previous history at the sites. The higher reward offers had a roughly linear effect among 
subjects with a past donation history at the sites (about 0.65 percentage points per dollar). However, among 
subjects without past history, the $15 reward had a strikingly large increase of over 400% (0.37/.08). 
 
Heterogeneous effects: We also explore whether the reward offer differentially affected subjects by adding 
an interaction term for each subject characteristic and INFO_REWARD to model (3), i.e., comparing subjects 
informed of rewards at the Advertised reward drives with all subjects at the Surprise reward drives.
19 To 
avoid higher-order interactions, we estimated each interaction separately, thus the heterogeneous effects for 
each characteristic are evaluated at the mean value of the other characteristics. Table 8 reports the results. 
There were no significant gender differences in the response to rewards. The likelihood to donate among 
men and women with a past history were 7.9 and 5.5 percentage points higher when informed of the rewards 
(Column 1), and men and women with no past history were 0.18 and 0.15 percentage points more likely to 
donate if informed of the rewards. These results differ from Mellstrom and Johannesson’s (MJ 2008) and 
Lacetera and Macis’ (LM 2010) results that find negative responses to rewards by women. However, there 
are many differences in methodologies and populations that may explain the differences; MJ 2008 examined 
a decision to take a health test among non-donor students (who knew they were taking part in a study), and 
LM 2010 examined stated preferences. Our results are based on actual donation behavior among existing 
donors who were unaware of participating in a study. 
We also do not detect significant differences in the response to incentives across age, blood type or total 
past donations among subjects with previous history at the intervention sites (Columns 2-4).  
                                                            
19 Appendix Table A3 shows estimates comparing subjects informed and uninformed of the rewards at the Advertised 
reward drives; the results are very similar, qualitatively and quantitatively, to those reported in Table 8. Appendix Table 
A4 shows estimates where we interact the subject characteristics with the different monetary values of the rewards.  19 
 
Among subjects with no past history (Columns 7 and 9), we find significant heterogeneity; subjects who 
were older, had donated more often and more recently, were significantly more likely to donate when a 
reward was offered. The age effect is somewhat surprising, if older subjects have less flexibility (so higher 
opportunity cost of time) and greater wealth (so lower marginal utility for the rewards). One potential 
explanation is that older donors may be more secure (or less concerned) with rewards undermining either 
their self or social image or undermining their intrinsic motivations. Since the age affect only occurs among 
subjects with no past donations at the intervention sites, age may also reflect greater mobility and, to the 
extent the oldest subjects may be retired, may also reflect greater free time. On the other hand, we are not 
surprised that subjects who have donated more often in the past and more recently were more likely to donate 
when a reward is offered since they may pay more attention to drive information and since their intrinsic 
motives were less affected by receiving a reward.
20 
 
4.1.2 The effect of the incentives at non-intervention drives: testing for spatial displacement 
The positive direct effect of reward offers on donations at the intervention drives may over-estimate the total 
increase in donations if the offer caused subjects to change the location of their donations from another drive 
to an intervention drive where rewards were offered.
21 Although this spatial displacement would be further 
evidence of incentives affecting subject’s behavior, it is important to quantify spatial displacement in order to 
measure the genuine total effect of the reward offer. 
To measure displacement, we now estimate the effect of our intervention on donations at ARC drives in 
Northern Ohio other than the intervention drives during the intervention period. If reward offers at the 
intervention drives attracted subjects who would have donated somewhere else in the same time period, then 
we should have observed a decrease in the likelihood to donate at other drives by subjects who were 
informed of the rewards. For this analysis, we assume that any unobserved blood donations at other locations 
outside of the ARC’s operations were unlikely to affect the displacement estimates in any meaningful way 
since other blood banks played a minor role in Northern Ohio (under 15% of the total units collected) and 
donors are unlikely to donate with multiple blood collection organizations.
22 In this section we also report 
                                                            
20 Appendix Table A4 shows that this effect was mostly driven by the $15 reward. 
21 Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (forthcoming), examining drive-level outcomes of the incentives that the ARC offered 
between 2006 and 2008, found a significant decrease in donations at spatially and temporally neighboring drives that 
did not offer incentives. 
22 It is also possible that displacement could occur outside Northern Ohio, but this is likely to reflect subjects moving 
rather an effect of the incentives. Displacement may also occur with plasma or platelet donations, however these blood 
products represent only a small percent of blood product donations and donors tend to be almost exclusively a whole 
blood donor only or a platelet donor only. Finally, subjects could more radically displace some other form of pro-social 
behavior in response to a blood donation reward offer, but this also seems unlikely to affect displacement estimates 
given the unobvious relationship between blood donations and other pro-social activities. An empirical analysis of 
displacement to all possibly relevant activities is beyond the scope of this paper, but studying displacement in the blood 
donation context may be as ideal a context as any given no close substitutes for blood donations (as opposed to, e.g., 
cash donations to a particular charity). 20 
 
estimates of the total effect of the reward offer at all ARC drives (including the intervention drives) during 
the intervention months. By assessing the effect of the reward offer on the likelihood to donate at any 
location during the intervention period we can determine the overall (short-term) effect of the offer. 
To examine displacement effects, we compare the behavior of subjects informed of the rewards at the 
Advertised drives with all subjects at the Surprise drives. We again estimate versions of model (3) but now 
use the outcome variables are “donated somewhere else” and “donated anywhere.” We again analyze 
subjects with and without a past donation history at the sites separately. Because the likelihood to donate 
somewhere else depends on the number and characteristics of the alternative options, these regressions add 
controls for the heterogeneity in the number of other drives included on the flyer that offered rewards when 
the intervention drive was advertised,
23 whether a blood drive was available during the intervention month at 
any site where the subject had donated in the past, and if that drive occurred, whether it offered a reward 
during the intervention month. The coefficient of interest in these regressions is again INFO_REWARD 
(equal to 1 if subject i was informed of the reward at the Advertised drive and to 0 if i was contacted for a 
Surprise drive). 
Table 9 presents the estimated coefficient on INFO_REWARD from twelve regressions. For comparison, 
Columns 1 and 4 show the estimates on “donated at the intervention drive” from Table 7 with the additional 
control variables for the number and characteristics of the alternative drives during the intervention period. 
Row 1 shows the estimates from regressions aggregating across the three reward values and Rows 2-4 
present the estimates with separate dummies for each reward value. In all these regressions we include period 
fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the drive level. Columns 1 and 4 show that the extra control 
variables directionally increase the estimated effect of reward offers on donations by about 0.7 and 0.02 
percentage points for subjects with and without past donation history, respectively, at the intervention drives 
(compared to those presented in Table 7), though they do not change the qualitative interpretation of any of 
the results described above. 
For subjects with a past donation history at the intervention sites, being informed of the rewards 
increased the likelihood of donating at an intervention site by 7.4 percentage points but decreased the 
likelihood that they donated at another site by 1.9 percentage points. The displacement effect thus reduced 
the total effect of the rewards by roughly 25% (1.9/7.4). The displacement effect was only marginally 
significant on average, but was significant for the $15 reward offer (p<.05). In this case, displacement 
reduced the local effect (10.2 percentage points) by roughly 40% for an overall effect of 6.1 percentage point 
net increase in donations. Thus, donors substituted among drives and the displacement was especially large 
when the incentive was large. Moreover, in contrast to the local effect, the overall effect on the likelihood to 
                                                            
23 We could control for either the number of drives offering incentives or the total number of drives on the flyer, but we 
could not include both since the correlation was nearly 80% between these two variables. The results do not change 
meaningfully with either control, and since the model fit and precision of most of the estimates are better when we 
control for the number of drives offering rewards, we present these estimates. 21 
 
donate when a $10 or $15 reward was offered no longer differs. Thus, offering higher rewards increased the 
likelihood of donating at the intervention drives, but this larger increase appears to be the result also of 
attracting subjects to relocate their donation location rather than to generate a genuine new donation.  
For subjects without a past donation history at the intervention sites, we do not find evidence for 
displacement effects;
24 on average, subjects without a past history were actually directionally more likely to 
donate at alternative locations, though the effect is estimated with substantial noise and none of the 
displacement estimates are close to significant. Given the directionally greater donations elsewhere, the 
coefficients on donated anywhere for subjects with past history is thus greater than the estimated coefficients 
for donations at the intervention drives only; for instance, over all rewards subjects were 0.33 percentage 
points more likely to donate anywhere (compared to only 0.19  percentage points more likely to donate at the 
intervention drives). However, since the overwhelming majority (over 99%) of their donations occurred at 
locations other than the intervention drives, there is much greater noise (unrelated to the experimental 
conditions) in these estimates. Thus, even though the overall effect is now 0.33 percentage points, it does not 
reach the level of significance as the standard errors increased from the intervention location estimate of 0.04 
(reported in Column 4) to 0.22 (reported in Column 6) for the standard error on the overall estimates. Even 
with the higher standard errors, however, we find that offering the $15 rewards increased the donations 
anywhere significantly (p<.05). 
In sum, we find a positive, significant direct effect of offering rewards on donations that increased with 
the dollar value of the rewards, but for subjects with a past donation history at the sites there was significant 
displacement such that the higher dollar value reward offers caused donors to change locations in response to 
the higher rewards, and thus the local effects over-estimated the total effects.  
 
4.2 The long-term impact of the rewards 
In Section 4.1 we assessed the overall short-term effect of offering incentives on donations during the 
intervention. However, the short-term impact is not sufficient to have a full view because some effects may 
have occurred after the intervention. For instance, a temporary reward offer may cause inter-temporal 
substitution or undermine motivations later. On the other hand, attracting people to donate when incentives 
are offered may help them develop a habit to donate, alter their expected donation costs or elicit reciprocity. 
                                                            
24 The higher displacement among subjects with than without past history is not surprising. First, in our past work, 
Lacetera et al. (forthcoming), the drive level analysis showed that displacement occurred but only within two miles of 
reward drives, thus most donors without past history are likely to live too far from the intervention drive locations to 
relocate donations. More importantly, Table 3 showed that subjects without past history donated at less locations in the 
past (1.9) and were more likely to have only donated at one location (55%) than donors with past history (3.0 and 29% 
respectively), thus donors with past history have a history of more flexibility in the locations they will donate at, and 
thus should be more prone to displacement effects. 22 
 
Our empirical strategy involves comparing an individual’s donation behavior before and after the 





periods, respectively. However, we limit the follow-up period to nine months after the intervention since that 
lets us use data from all four periods and since the longer the time horizon the noisier the data (e.g., increased 
likelihood of subjects moving outside the region). We compare subject donations in the N weeks preceding 
an intervention (“pre”) to donations in the N weeks after the intervention (“post”), with N = 13, 26 and 39.
25 
We analyze behavior over different time horizons to check if the effects, if any, are temporary or persistent. 
We examine two outcomes: whether a subject donated and the total number of donations. The latter 
outcome is only used for the 26 and 39 week intervals because a subject who donated at an intervention drive 
could only donate at most once within the 13 weeks pre- and post-intervention due to the eligibility 
restrictions. 
We present results for the subjects who donated at one of the intervention drives during the intervention 
periods.
26 We compare subject behavior between those receiving and not receiving the reward, and we 
further distinguish between the subjects who were and were not informed in advance of the reward offer. 
Thus, subjects are divided into three categories: (a) those who donated at a No reward drive and were not 
contacted for any Advertised reward drive during the intervention period; these subjects were unaware of the 
intervention reward being offered and did not receive any reward; (b) those who donated at an Advertised 
reward drive and were informed in advance of the reward through the ARC’s formal channels; these subjects 
were the most likely subjects to be aware of the reward offer and received the reward when they donated; and 
(c) those who donated at a Surprise reward drive and were not contacted for any Advertised reward drive; 
these subjects were unaware of the intervention reward being offered but received a reward as a surprise gift 
when they donated.
27 Tables 10 and 11 compare group (b) to (a) and (c) to (a), respectively. To make these 
comparisons, we estimate versions of the following model: 
 
Yit = +POST+2POST*TR_COND +Xit+i+it,   (4) 
 
where Yit is the outcome for subject i in period t (where t = pre or post intervention). The regressions include 
individual fixed effects (i). POST is a dummy for the period after the intervention that captures any seasonal 
changes or trends in donations; the coefficient on POST will measure the change in donations for the No 
reward control group (a). TR_COND indicates the treatment condition for subject i where i could be in 
                                                            
25 We use weeks since most drives at each location occur on the same day of the week and since most individuals 
donate at the same location over time. The number of weeks of eligibility is identical in the pre and post periods; 
subjects who donated at an intervention drive could not have donated eight weeks prior to or after the intervention.   
26 We also explored the long term effects of the rewards on subjects who did not donate at the intervention sites and find 
no significant changes in their post intervention donation behavior compared to their pre intervention behavior. 
27 In principle, this group could include also the individuals who donated at Advertised reward drives and were not 
informed of the presence of rewards. However, since at least some of these individuals could have known about the 
incentives in advance (as from the findings in section 4.1.2), we excluded them from this analysis. 23 
 
condition (b) (Table 10) or condition (c) (Table 11), or in the omitted No reward condition (a) (both Tables). 
Since we estimate individual fixed effects and each subject was only in one condition, the regressions omit 
the main effect for the variable TR_COND. The critical parameter estimate reported in the tables is the 
interaction POST*TR_COND that measures the change in donation likelihood (or number of donations) post 
vs. pre-intervention for subjects in the treatment (b or c) versus the No reward control condition (a). 
No reward vs. Advertised reward: For subjects with past history at an intervention site, Panel A of Table 
10 shows a significant decrease in donations 13 weeks after than before a donation at an intervention drive 
for those who donated at the Advertised as compared to those who donated at No reward drives. The average 
reduction was 12 percentage points from a baseline donation rate of 50%, and a slight increase in the post-
intervention donation probability for those who donated at the No reward drives. The overall negative effect 
was increasing in the value of the reward, and particularly strong (and statistically significant) for the $15 
reward. There was no significant systematic effect for longer periods of time, however. Panel A also shows 
that for subjects with no past history at the sites there was no significant difference in donations after versus 
before the donation at the intervention drive. Panel B indicates that for both subjects with and without past 
history there was essentially no significant change in the number of donations in the 26 and 39 weeks after 
than before the intervention date for subjects who donated at the Advertised than No reward drives.  
These findings are consistent with subjects with past history substituting the timing of donations to 
obtain the rewards rather than causing a permanent negative effect on motivation. First, while individuals 
are, ceteris paribus, more likely to incur the same rescheduling costs regardless of the dollar value of the 
rewards, the benefits of rescheduling are greater the higher the reward value. Second, and more importantly, 
since the negative effect disappears after 13 weeks it is unlikely to reflect a permanent change in motivation. 
No reward vs. Surprise reward: Table 11 presents the estimates of the post-intervention effects on subjects 
who received the reward as a surprise gift. The estimates in Panel A of Table 11 show a significant decline in 
post-intervention donations for the subjects who received a surprise reward relative to their pre-intervention 
behavior compared to the change in behavior among subjects who donated at No reward drives. The overall 
decline remained significant for the full 39 weeks that we observed donations. Compared to the trend 
towards lower donations in the No reward group for the 26 and 39 week post intervention periods, -7.1 and -
6.1 percentage points, respectively, the additional decline for subjects who donated at the Surprise drives was 
even larger, -10.7 and -8.6 percentage points, respectively. Panel B also shows that there is a significantly 
larger decline in the total number of donations among subjects who donated at the Advertised than No 
reward drives 39 weeks after than before the intervention, and the magnitude is quite substantial; while 
subjects who donated at the No reward drives donated on average 0.13 less units of blood after than before 
the intervention, subjects who donated at the Surprise reward drives donated an additional 0.35 units less, so 24 
 
the decline was roughly three times larger for the subjects at the Surprise drive, and represents approximately 
a 15% additional drop in donations from the pre-donation level of 2.15 units. These negative significant 
effects, however, are detected only for subjects who had a previous history at the intervention sites; for 
subjects with no history at the interventions, we detect no significant difference in donations after than before 
the intervention period between subjects who donated at the Surprise and No reward drives. 
The first conclusion from Table 11 is that there is no evidence of reciprocity; if subjects who received a 
gift by surprise wanted to reciprocate, they would have responded by donating more, not less, in the future. 
While this result is at odds with many laboratory experiments examining reciprocity, it is consistent with the 
lack of support for reciprocity behavior reported in some recent field evidence in labor markets and 
charitable fund raising (e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006). 
There are at least two possible mechanisms that could explain the fall in donations after the surprise gift. 
First, some subjects might have been repulsed by the presence of the rewards, and the post-intervention 
decline in donations might reflect this repugnance. However, as reported above, regardless of whether 
subjects were informed in advance of the rewards and regardless of the dollar value, almost all subjects took 
the gift cards and spent almost the full amount within a short period of time. If they were opposed to 
receiving a gift for making a donation, they could have refused to take them or not use them. Thus we favor a 
second explanation: for a subset of subjects, the (unexpected) presence of the rewards led to a subsequent 
reduction in intrinsic motivation. This undermining of motivation is consistent with the prolonged reduction 
in donations throughout the post intervention time. It is also consistent with a potential sorting in which the 
subjects who would lose motivation if a reward was offered could avoid the intervention drives offering 
rewards, but could not avoid them when the rewards were a surprise; Lazear et al. (forthcoming) found 
similar sorting in which subjects sacrificed money to avoid playing a game in which they could have been 
perceived to behave antisocially.  
 
4.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
We now use our results to quantify the cost of rewards per each extra unit of blood collected when a reward 
was offered. Since we find no evidence that offering rewards significantly affected donations in the longer 
term (with the exception of Surprise reward drives, which we do not consider here because giving reward by 
surprise is not a practice of the ARC – Northern Ohio Blood Services), we only include the extra units 
collected during the intervention period. We also only consider parameter estimates that are statistically 
significant, and assign a value of zero to the others.  
The analysis, reported in Table 12, uses the information from Table 9. Columns 1 and 4 in Table 9 show 
that 13.2% and 0.08% of contacted subjects with and without prior history at the intervention sites, 
respectively, donated when uninformed of the rewards. This result is reported in the first row of Table 12 that 25 
 
assumes 100 individuals are contacted. The third row in Table 12 reports the additional units of blood 
collected when the reward was offered (Columns 3 and 6 in Table 9). Since the ARC has to give the reward 
to all donors presenting, regardless of whether they donated, we need to convert the estimates on units 
collected to donors presenting in order to determine the number and costs of the rewards that have to be 
given to donors. Our past work (Lacetera et al., forthcoming) found that the blood units collected were 13% 
less than the number of presenting donors due to deferrals, regardless of the presence or cost of the reward. 
Table 12 thus shows the donors presenting to be the units collected times 1.149 (=1.00/0.87); Rows 2, 4 and 
5 show the estimated number of donors who presented when no incentives were offered, the extra donors 
presenting when incentives were offered and the total number of donors presenting when incentives were 
offered, respectively. Row 6 indicates the total cost of the rewards per 100 contacted individuals, i.e. the 
product of donors presenting and dollar value of the gift cards, and Row 7 reports the additional cost per 
extra unit of blood collected. For individuals with past history at the intervention location, offering the $10 
reward was more cost effective than offering the $15 reward. It was more cost effective since the $15 reward 
attracted more individuals to donate at the intervention drive that had to be given the reward, which was 
more expensive, and since the number of extra units collected was not different between the two reward 
amounts for donations everywhere that adjusts for the larger displacement when the $15 rewards were 
offered. The $15 offer to subjects with no past donation history at the intervention sites was the most cost 
effective; its advantage derives from attracting the greatest number of extra donors (0.45 per hundred) 
relative to those who would have donated without the reward (0.08 per hundred).
28 
Estimating the benefit from collecting one extra unit of blood is more difficult. One approach is to 
estimate a lower bound based on the amount that is paid for each unit of blood. The Medicare hospital 
outpatient payment rate for a unit of whole blood for transfusion was set in 2010 at $206.25 (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010).
29 This suggests that the $10 and $15 rewards for people with 
previous history and the $15 rewards for people without history are highly cost effective. Another approach 
is to calculate the value of the potential uses of the additional blood collected. For example, about 7 units of 
blood are needed for brain surgery, hip replacement and for cancer treatment on average per patient in a 
week, as well as for certain organ transplants (Canadian Blood Service, 2011). To fully capture the benefits, 
we would need to further determine the expected impact of these procedures on the life expectancy and 
quality of the patients multiplied by the dollar value of those extra (quality-adjusted) years of life to the 
                                                            
28 These estimates ignore the marginal costs of the ARC operations to collect each additional unit. We assume these are 
relatively small given the scale of the ARC’s operations and that the marginal costs for the equipment and storage are 
assumed to be very low. 
29  Personal communications with medical professionals suggest that the amount that hospitals bill to patients and 
insurers when performing transfusions can reach about $1,000 per blood unit. 26 
 
recipient as well as to the rest of society.
30 Although there may be potentially large variation in these 
expected benefits, it seems reasonable to assume that the benefits will far outweigh the extra costs we have 
estimated. 
 
5. Summary and discussion 
Titmuss’ (1971) claim that offering material rewards for blood donations might backfire and lower donations 
has motivated many studies on the impact of explicit rewards on several intrinsically motivated activities. In 
particular, concerns have been raised that explicit incentives for pro-social activities can be counter-
productive and lower supply of these tasks.  The evidence has been mixed, and no study has offered a 
comprehensive picture within the same field setting of whether and how incentives might affect pro-social 
behavior including the shape of the supply curve, heterogeneity in individual responses, spatial and temporal 
responses and indirect responses that motivate others. Our natural field experiment on the effect of material 
rewards on blood donation fills this gap.  
The first-order, robust finding of this study is that providing material rewards led to a large and 
significant increase in the propensity to donate, and in a very standard way: the effect was increasing in the 
amount of the incentives. In addition to this direct effect, we observed that more uninformed and non-
contacted subjects donated when others had been informed of the rewards, suggesting that the reward offer 
caused an indirect effect in which informed individuals motivated others to donate. We also found that 
rewards led to some spatial and short-term inter-temporal displacement. Finally, we observed a long-term 
decline in donations among subjects who received a gift by surprise; thus we found no evidence of 
reciprocity and instead observed responses consistent with motivational undermining effects after receiving 
an unexpected reward.  
The results suggest some key implications for blood collection agencies. First, although spatial 
substitution in a given period might be a concern since it reduces the full impact of incentives, the presence 
of substitution over time could enhance efficiency in blood collection or any other pro-social activity for 
which demand varies over time; incentives might be an effective way of reallocating donations toward 
periods of greater shortage. Second, the negative long term effect on donations after the surprise gifts were 
given to donors implies that it is preferable to inform people of the presence of rewards in advance. 
The experiment and evidence described in this paper, in addition to contributing to the debate on how 
economic incentives affect the supply of public goods and pro-social activities, also offers insights to 
policymakers and organizations interested in enhancing the supply of blood as well as other health-related 
products whose availability relies on a vast and disperse set of (mostly volunteer) suppliers. Examples 
                                                            
30 Note that one unit of blood collected provides a full unit of red cells and several partial units of plasma, platelets and 
cryoprecipitate. In general, up to three of these four products can be derived from one unit and used on multiple 
patients. 27 
 
include the millions of hours that people volunteer in hospitals and organizations like the Red Cross, or the 
donation of bone marrow and organs. A number of initiatives in developing countries are also based on the 
diffused distribution of health products, such as bed nets and condoms (Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack, 2011, 
Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2011). 
We conclude by discussing some directions for future research. First, the subjects studied in this paper 
had all donated at least once in the past. Although studying existing donors is a natural starting point to study 
the effect of incentives on donations, future research can examine whether incentives can be used to induce 
non-donors to donate, and potentially become long-term donors. Note, however, that people who have never 
donated are, ceteris paribus, presumably less intrinsically motivated than current donors, and therefore it 
might be problematic (if appropriate at all) to test for any tradeoff between extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. 
Second, in this paper we assessed the effect of incentives in an environment where donors are used to seeing 
them offered. An interesting question is whether incentives would have similar positive effects if they were 
offered a setting where they have never been offered. Third, and closely related to the previous point, it 
would also be interesting to learn whether incentives would have a similar positive effect if they were 
offered all the time, or whether individuals would habituate to the presence of incentives and so donation 
levels would revert to levels without reward offers. Fourth, we focused on incentives with a financial value 
in this paper, but other motivators and actions (e.g., social recognition, reducing waiting times, having 
donors make appointments, rewarding hosts or ARC representatives, or encouraging donors to actively focus 
on the donation decision)
31 could be used to induce more blood donations, and it would be interesting – from 





31 For instance, Stutzer, Goette and Zehnder (2011) find that active-decision reflection increases donations among 
individuals who have not thought about the importance of blood donations. 28 
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N. of drives in reference year 5.56 5.70 6.00
(1.38) (1.30) (0.71)
Fraction of drives with incentives 0.21 0.24 0.25
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Average drive length ( h o u r s ) 5 . 2 25 . 2 94 . 9 8
(0.76) (0.62) (0.77)
Average N. of donors presenting 30.68 32.05 27.38
(10.20) (9.63) (7.97)
Average N. of units of blood collected 26.69 28.07 23.79
(8.94) (8.34) (7.59)
Donors deferred as a share of presenting 0.13 0.12 0.14
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
At intervention drive


























Female 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.51
O‐Negative blood type 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09
Age
16‐25 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.31
26‐50 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.38
51+ 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.30 0.30 0.31
Total N. of previous donations
1‐4 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.54 0.54 0.54
5‐9 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
10+ 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.30
Time of last donation 
prior to intervention
within 6 months 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.37 0.37 0.37
between 6 and 12 months 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.28
more than 12 months 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.35
Number of sites where
donated in the past
Mean 2.0 2.0 1.8 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.0 1.9 1.7
Share donated at one site only 0.55 0.55 0.64 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.56 0.56 0.65





























( 1 )( 2 )( 3 ) ( 4 )( 5 )( 6 ) ( 7 )( 8 )( 9 )
Informed of Reward 0.33*** 4.55*** 0.16***
(0.06) (1.23) (0.03)
Informed of $5 Reward 0.10 0.15* 1.37 3.21* 0.05* 0.06*
(0.07) (0.08) (1.66) (1.93) (0.03) (0.04)
Informed of $10 Reward 0.32*** 0.31*** 4.89** 5.57** 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.08) (0.09) (1.94) (2.30) (0.04) (0.05)
Informed of $15 Reward 0.67*** 0.61*** 7.29*** 4.65** 0.36*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.13) (1.73) (2.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Female ‐0.17*** ‐0.16*** ‐0.17*** ‐2.55** ‐2.46** ‐2.03 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (1.24) (1.24) (1.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 26‐50 ‐0.00 ‐0.00 ‐0.00 2.59 2.65 3.38** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (1.67) (1.66) (1.69) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 50+ 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 7.23*** 7.42*** 9.09*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (1.75) (1.74) (1.77) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
O‐Negative blood type ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.07 ‐0.51 ‐0.33 ‐0.20 ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (2.04) (2.04) (1.96) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Between 5 and 9 past donations ‐0.26*** ‐0.26*** ‐0.26*** ‐1.99 ‐1.95 ‐1.57 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (1.64) (1.64) (1.65) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
More than 10 past donations 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 3.40** 3.31** 3.12** 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (1.57) (1.57) (1.59) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Last donation within past 6 months 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 18.46*** 18.44*** 19.19*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (1.28) (1.28) (1.29) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Last donation between 6 and 12 months 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 2.38* 2.39* 3.61*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1.32) (1.32) (1.36) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Previous history at site 17.19*** 17.17*** 16.95***
(0.63) (0.63) (0.64)
P‐value of:
$10 Informed ≥ $5 Informed 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.08
$15 Informed ≥ $10 Informed 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.61 0.00 0.01
$15 Informed ≥ $5 Informed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00
Drive FEs No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 92,722 92,722 92,722 3,516 3,516 3,516 89,206 89,206 89,206








































Observations 2,939 2,939 79,317 79,317



















N. of d r i v e s 3 692 6
Share of total N. of drives 50.7% 12.7% 36.6%
N. of non‐contacted donors 148 28 152









N. of d r i v e s 3 692 6
Share of total N. of drives 50.7% 12.7% 36.6%
N. of non‐contacted donors 56 5 47









N. of d r i v e s 3 692 6
Share of total N. of drives 50.7% 12.7% 36.6%
N. of non‐contacted donors 92 23 105









































Observations 3,035 3,035 79,367 79,367
Adjusted R‐squared 0.09 0.09 0.002 0.002
 1 if donated at intervention drive, 0 otherwise
Previous history at site No previous history at site











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Informed of Reward 7.93 5.65 6.66 7.00 2.67 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.02
(1.96)*** (2.63)** (1.41)*** (2.17)*** (1.65) (0.04)*** (0.04) (0.03)*** (0.03)* (0.02)
[2.76]*** [2.55]** [2.05]*** [2.56]*** [1.91] [0.05]*** [0.04] [0.05]*** [0.04] [0.02]
Female ‐1.82 ‐3.31 ‐3.30 ‐3.30 ‐3.38 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.88) (1.33)** (1.33)** (1.33)** (1.33)** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[1.27] [1.31]** [1.31]** [1.31]** [1.33]** [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Age 26‐50 0.24 0.37 0.25 0.26 0.44 0.03 ‐0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02
(1.82) (2.32) (1.82) (1.82) (1.82) (0.03) (0.03)* (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[1.58] [2.65] [1.57] [1.57] [1.58] [0.04] [0.02]*** [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Age 5 0 + 4 . 4 23 . 2 14 . 4 24 . 4 14 . 6 1 0 . 1 50 . 0 20 . 1 50 . 1 50 . 1 4
(1.89)** (2.34) (1.89)** (1.89)** (1.89)** (0.05)*** (0.05) (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
[1.76]** [2.32] [1.76]** [1.75]** [1.71]** [0.04]*** [0.04] [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
O‐Negative blood type ‐3.87 ‐3.89 ‐4.28 ‐3.93 ‐3.95 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 0.00 ‐0.03 ‐0.03
(2.01)* (2.01)* (2.85) (2.01)* (2.01)** (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
[2.26]* [2.26]* [2.84] [2.26]* [2.26]* [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Between 5 and 9 past donations ‐0.11 ‐0.04 ‐0.08 0.53 ‐0.28 0.08 0.08 0.08 ‐0.01 0.07
(1.73) (1.73) (1.73) (2.30) (1.73) (0.05) (0.05)* (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
[1.76] [1.76] [1.77] [2.90] [1.81] [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.03] [0.04]
More than 10 past donations 4.88 4.89 4.89 4.97 4.74 0.05 0.05 0.05 ‐0.10 0.05
(1.67)*** (1.67)*** (1.67)*** (2.22)** (1.67)*** (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)** (0.05)
[1.89]** [1.90]** [1.89]** [2.71]* [1.92]** [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]* [0.05]
Last donation within past 6 months 18.15 18.15 18.13 18.16 13.99 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.10
(1.37)*** (1.37)*** (1.37)*** (1.37)*** (1.85)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
[2.19]*** [2.18]*** [2.19]*** [2.20]*** [2.02]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]*** [0.05]*** [0.04]**
Last donation between 6 and 12 months 1.69 1.72 1.72 1.73 1.55 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04
(1.35) (1.35) (1.35) (1.35) (1.78) (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)

























Observations 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 79,367 79,367 79,367 79,367 79,367





































13.19% 11.56% 24.75% 0.08% 9.37% 9.43%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All 7.41 ‐1.94 5.46 0.19 0.13 0.33
(1.39)*** (1.16)* (1.61)*** (0.03)*** (0.21) (0.22)
[2.29]*** [1.57] [1.76]*** [0.05]*** [0.31] [0.31]
$5 Adv. Rew. 4.36 ‐0.95 3.41 0.09 ‐0.41 ‐0.31
(1.82)** (1.61) (2.14) (0.04)** (0.27) (0.27)
[2.74] [1.78] [2.48] [0.05]* [0.34] [0.35]
$10 Adv. Rew. 7.14 ‐0.35 6.79 0.15 0.38 0.53
(2.01)*** (1.64) (2.29)*** (0.04)*** (0.27) (0.27)**
[3.16]** [2.17] [2.39]*** [0.08]* [0.41] [0.40]
$15 Adv. Rew. 10.15 ‐4.09 6.07 0.39 0.41 0.80
(1.89)*** (1.36)*** (2.09)*** (0.07)*** (0.32) (0.33)**
[3.04]*** [1.62]** [2.58]** [0.10]*** [0.37] [0.35]**
P‐value of:
$10 Adv.Rew. ≥ $5 Adv.Rew. 0.26 0.57 0.20 0.21 0.98 0.01
$15 Adv.Rew. ≥ $10  Adv.Rew. 0.26 0.10 0.56 0.04 0.43 0.39
$15 Adv.Rew. ≥ $5 Adv.Rew. 0.08 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.00





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
POST 4.21 4.21 ‐7.12*** ‐7.12*** ‐6.15*** ‐6.15*** 2.22 2.22 ‐6.67 ‐6.67 ‐15.56* ‐15.56*
(3.59) (3.60) (2.65) (2.65) (2.29) (2.29) (7.41) (7.43) (8.60) (8.63) (8.92) (8.95)
POST*DON_INFO REWARD ‐12.43** ‐1.65 ‐1.80 1.23 0.63 5.21
(4.97) (3.77) (3.25) (9.29) (10.08) (10.13)
POST*DON_$5 INFO REWARD ‐2.34 ‐0.36 0.54 9.78 6.67 7.56
(7.06) (5.42) (4.75) (16.17) (13.13) (13.24)
POST*DON_$10 INFO REWARD ‐11.90 ‐0.57 ‐0.58 ‐5.00 15.00 15.56
(7.25) (6.02) (5.12) (10.49) (13.22) (12.60)
POST*DON_$15 INFO REWARD ‐19.79*** ‐3.27 ‐4.24 1.41 ‐11.52 ‐2.63
(6.42) (4.78) (4.16) (11.36) (11.36) (11.31)
P‐value of:
$10 Informed ‐ $5 Informed 0.27 0.98 0.86 0.36 0.56 0.55
$15 Informed ‐ $10 Informed 0.23 0.69 0.53 0.57 0.04 0.11
$15 Informed ‐ $5 Informed 0.03 0.64 0.38 0.62 0.14 0.40
Observations 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 322 322 322 322 322 322
N of donors 653 653 653 653 653 653 161 161 161 161 161 161
R‐squared 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06
No previous history at site Previous history at site
13 weeks
47.57% 86.08% 92.23% 20.00% 60.00% 75.56%









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST ‐0.16*** ‐0.16*** ‐0.13* ‐0.13* ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
POST*DON_INFO REWARD 0.06 ‐0.01 0.06 ‐0.08
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.21)
POST*DON_$5 INFO REWARD 0.22* 0.11 0.14 ‐0.04
(0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.30)
POST*DON_$10 INFO REWARD ‐0.13 ‐0.07 0.19 ‐0.07
(0.12) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26)
POST*DON_$15 INFO REWARD 0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.07 ‐0.12
(0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.24)
P‐value of:
$10 Informed ‐ $5 Informed 0.02 0.31 0.83 0.92
$15 Informed ‐ $10 Informed 0.15 0.89 0.19 0.84
$15 Informed ‐ $5 Informed 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.77
Observations 1,348 1,348 1,348 1,348 322 322 322 322
N of donors 653 653 653 653 161 161 161 161

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
POST 4.21 4.21 ‐7.12*** ‐7.12*** ‐6.15*** ‐6.15*** 2.22 2.22 ‐6.67 ‐6.67 ‐15.56* ‐15.56*
(3.59) (3.60) (2.64) (2.65) (2.29) (2.29) (7.47) (7.52) (8.67) (8.73) (8.99) (9.05)
POST*DON_SURPR.REWARD ‐20.77*** ‐10.67** ‐8.58** 4.92 ‐4.05 8.41
(5.86) (4.86) (4.36) (14.53) (12.76) (12.55)
POST*DON_$5 SURPR.REWARD ‐14.55* ‐3.23 ‐5.92 14.44 ‐10.00 ‐1.11
(8.42) (7.28) (7.32) (29.62) (17.82) (17.98)
POST*DON_$10 SURPR.REWARD ‐27.64*** ‐16.32** ‐9.48 ‐2.22 ‐15.56 ‐17.78
(8.11) (6.72) (5.99) (17.72) (16.63) (18.42)
POST*DON_$15 SURPR.REWARD ‐18.84* ‐12.39 ‐10.92 5.47 6.67 30.94**
(10.18) (9.03) (7.21) (21.99) (17.97) (13.65)
P‐value of:
$10 Surpr. ‐ $5 Surpr. 0.21 0.15 0.69 0.61 0.79 0.46
$15 Surpr. ‐ $10 Surpr. 0.46 0.71 0.87 0.77 0.30 0.01
$15 Surpr. ‐ $5 Surpr. 0.74 0.40 0.61 0.80 0.45 0.09
Observations 944 944 944 944 944 944 146 146 146 146 146 146
N of d o n o r s 4 7 1 4 7 1 4 7 1 4 7 1 4 7 1 4 7 1 7 37 37 37 37 37 3




13 weeks 26 weeks 39 weeks 13 weeks 26 weeks 39 weeks
Previous history at site No previous history at site







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST ‐0.16*** ‐0.16*** ‐0.13* ‐0.13* ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18)
POST*DON_SURPR.REWARD ‐0.12 ‐0.35*** ‐0.01 0.12
(0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.28)
POST*DON_$5 SURPR.REWARD 0.11 ‐0.25 ‐0.14 0.04
(0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.38)
POST*DON_$10 SURPR.REWARD ‐0.31* ‐0.53*** ‐0.09 ‐0.18
(0.16) (0.18) (0.28) (0.45)
POST*DON_$15 SURPR.REWARD ‐0.16 ‐0.19 0.10 0.35
(0.20) (0.24) (0.26) (0.38)
P‐value of:
$10 Surpr. ‐ $5 Surpr. 0.04 0.25 0.85 0.68
$15 Surpr. ‐ $10 Surpr. 0.53 0.23 0.59 0.33
$15 Surpr. ‐ $5 Surpr. 0.26 0.83 0.39 0.53
Observations 944 944 944 944 146 146 146 146
N of donors 471 471 471 471 73 73 73 73




26 weeks 39 weeks 26 weeks 39 weeks
Previous history at site No previous history at site






$5 $10 $15 $5 $10 $15
All values are per 100 individuals contacted
1U n i t s  collected ‐ baseline when no incentives offered 
(1) 13.18 13.18 13.18 0.08 0.08 0.08
2 Donors presenting ‐ baseline when no incentives offered
(2) 15.14 15.14 15.14 0.09 0.09 0.09
3E x t r a  units collected when incentives offered
(3) ‐‐ 6.79 6.07 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.80
4E x t r a  donors presenting when incentives offered
(1)(2) ‐‐ 8.20 11.66 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.45
5T o t a l  N. of donors presenting when incentives offered 15.14 23.35 26.81 0.09 0.09 0.54
6$  cost of providing incentives
(4) $75.70 $233.5 $402.1 $0.50 $0.50 $8.1
8$  cost per extra unit collected























































Donated at Surprise Reward drive [N] 0.53 [35,968] 13.18 [1,229] 0.08 [34,736]
























( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )
Informed of Reward 0.06*** 3.80*** 0.083***
(0.01) (1.07) (0.02)
Informed of $5 Reward 0.04** 3.37 0.05
(0.02) (2.12) (0.04)
Informed of $10 Reward 0.07*** 5.07** 0.11**
(0.03) (2.51) (0.05)
Informed of $15 Reward 0.09*** 4.13** 0.21***
(0.03) (2.00) (0.08)
Observations 92,722 92,722 3,509 3,509 89,206 89,206












( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )
Informed of Reward 0.08*** 6.021*** 0.10***
(0.02) (1.79) (0.03)
Informed of $5 Reward 0.05* 3.51 0.05
(0.03) (2.64) (0.04)
Informed of $10 Reward 0.10*** 7.26** 0.12
(0.03) (3.16) (0.08)
Informed of $15 Reward 0.18*** 9.71*** 0.30***
(0.05) (3.09) (0.10)
Observations 82,402 82,402 3,035 3,035 79,367 79,367
Adjusted R‐squared 0.43 0.43 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.09
Subjects contacted for an Advertised reward drive
Sample 
0.65 % 13.18 %0 . 0 9  %
 1 if donated at intervention drive, 0 otherwise










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Informed of Reward 6.12*** 6.84*** 5.00*** 3.89* 2.13 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.06* 0.01
(1.79) (2.50) (1.28) (2.08) (1.60) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Female ‐0.24 ‐2.05* ‐1.98 ‐2.02 ‐2.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01
(1.67) (1.23) (1.23) (1.23) (1.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 26‐50 3.34** 5.16** 3.33** 3.35** 3.41** 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(1.69) (2.02) (1.68) (1.69) (1.68) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 50+ 9.06*** 10.20*** 9.02*** 9.08*** 9.12*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(1.77) (2.11) (1.77) (1.78) (1.78) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
O‐Negative blood type ‐0.15 ‐0.24 2.89 ‐0.23 ‐0.25 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 ‐0.06
(1.96) (1.96) (2.92) (1.96) (1.96) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Between 5 and 9 past donations ‐1.68 ‐1.60 ‐1.59 ‐2.03 ‐1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 ‐0.13*** 0.00
(1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (2.15) (1.65) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
More than 10 past donations 3.06* 3.14** 3.12** 2.82 3.15** 0.05 0.05 0.05 ‐0.07 0.05
(1.59) (1.59) (1.59) (2.02) (1.59) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Last donation within past 6 months 19.25*** 19.15*** 19.20*** 19.18*** 16.92*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.08**
(1.29) (1.29) (1.29) (1.29) (1.66) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Last donation between 6 and 12 months 3.72*** 3.58*** 3.62*** 3.59*** 4.47** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.00

















Observations 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 3,516 89,206 89,206 89,206 89,206 89,206














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Informed of $5 Reward 2.30 ‐2.32 4.10* 3.51 2.24 0.09* ‐0.04* 0.05 ‐0.03 ‐0.02
(2.75) (2.51) (2.40) (3.32) (2.27) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Informed of $10 Reward 8.28** 6.16 6.31* 10.01** 3.24 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.05
(4.00) (3.96) (3.22) (4.48) (3.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Informed of $15 Reward 12.41*** 11.60*** 9.08*** 7.71** 2.61 0.40*** 0.17* 0.39*** 0.26** 0.06**
(4.23) (3.07) (2.84) (3.00) (2.53) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03)
Female ‐1.82 ‐3.24** ‐3.21** ‐3.18** ‐3.27** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.27) (1.27) (1.29) (1.30) (1.30) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 26‐50 0.15 0.41 0.26 0.26 0.43 0.03 ‐0.06*** 0.03 0.03 0.02
(1.59) (2.66) (1.55) (1.56) (1.58) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 50+ 4.55** 3.29 4.55** 4.64** 4.85*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(1.75) (2.32) (1.70) (1.71) (1.69) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
O‐Negative blood type ‐3.68 ‐3.66 ‐4.25 ‐3.67 ‐4.02* ‐0.03 ‐0.03 0.00 ‐0.03 ‐0.03
(2.20) (2.20) (2.83) (2.19) (2.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Between 5 and 9 past donations ‐0.03 ‐0.00 ‐0.04 0.50 ‐0.13 0.07 0.08 0.07 ‐0.01 0.07
(1.76) (1.75) (1.75) (2.90) (1.82) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
More than 10 past donations 4.88** 4.87** 4.90** 4.95* 4.83** 0.04 0.04 0.04 ‐0.10* 0.04
(1.90) (1.90) (1.89) (2.72) (1.88) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Last donation within past 6 months 18.12*** 18.13*** 18.04*** 18.14*** 13.95*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.10**
(2.17) (2.17) (2.17) (2.18) (2.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Last donation between 6 and 12 months 1.65 1.82* 1.80* 1.72* 1.53 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04






























































Observations 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 79,367 79,367 79,367 79,367 79,367
Adjusted R‐squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
Sample 
Subjects informed of reward at Adv. or uninformed at Surp. drives
1 if donated at intervention drive, 0 otherwise
Previous history at site No previous history at site
 
 
 
 
 